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Woodford’s (2003) model of a cashless economy is the basis for his book Interest and Prices.  
Since Woodford assumes complete markets, this paper explicitly includes state-contingent 
securities with either temporary money or a cash-in-advance constraint to analyze 
Woodford’s logic.  This analysis finds four logical problems with Woodford’s analysis: (1) 
Woodford’s assumption that his solution is bounded is inappropriate.  (2) Any finite 
version of Woodford’s model is incomplete.  (3) Woodford’s central bank does not control 
nominal interest rates. (4) Woodford argument that interest rates determine prices and 
that prices affect the interest rate is circular and hence invalid. 
 
 - 1 - 
Multiple Critiques of Woodford’s Model of a Cashless Economy 
 
  Woodford’s (2003) book Interest and Prices is considered by some to be the cornerstone 
of the New Keynesian Economics.  Woodford bases his book on his Chapter 2 model of a 
cashless economy.  No monetary frictions exist and the price level is flexible in that model.  This 
paper reports four logical flaws in Woodford’s analysis of this model. 
  I cannot help but be reminded of the children’s story, “The Emperor Who Had No 
Clothes.”  This story is about a tailor who supposedly makes the Emperor an outfit with such 
“fine” thread that people can see through it.  In fact no one can even see the thread.  When the 
Emperor is parading his “outfit” in front of his subjects, a child speaks up, “but he has no clothes 
on.”  I am like that child, reporting that Woodford’s model is naked once we remove the cloak of 
infinity that clouds our ability to see his model for what it really is.  You the readers are like the 
rest of the Emperor’s subjects.  The question remains whether you will react to what I report. 
The first flaw is Woodford’s assumption that the solution to his model must be bounded.  
It is true that a precedent for making that assumption does exist in the economic literature and in 
particular the literature related to price determinacy.  However, this paper reports that that 
precedent is invalid and unsound at least in its general application.  Just because a major 
economist says one should make that assumption does not mean we should.  Making such an 
assumption when mathematically solving for a solution can only be justified by a mathematical 
proof that it is valid.  This paper reports on a literature review that has traced the bounded 
assumption to Sargent (1979).  The literature review concludes that Sargent never proved that the 
bounded assumption applies in all cases.  In fact, personal correspondence with Sargent himself 
confirms the lack of such a universal proof. Furthermore, this paper cites other work where it has - 2 - 
been shown that Sargent’s precedent can lead to incorrect solutions.  Personal correspondence 
with other economists confirms that the bounded assumption does not universally apply. 
Sargent (1979) did show that his precedent was valid in one case by assuming a finite 
horizon and then looking at the resulting transversality condition as the horizon goes to infinity.  
When we look at a finite-version of Woodford’s model, however, we find that his model is 
incomplete.  That a finite version of his model is incomplete is the second flaw of Woodford’s 
analysis. 
Woodford assumes that markets are complete, but he does not explicitly model the 
securities that make markets complete.  In this paper, we do explicitly include state-contingent 
securities to complete the markets.  By doing so, we demonstrate a third flaw in Woodford’s 
analysis – Woodford’s central bank cannot affect the market nominal interest rate. 
As part of his argument that prices are determined in his model, Woodford assumes a 
feedback policy rule whereby the current price level affects the interest rate the central bank 
pegs.  The fourth flaw in Woodford’s analysis is that Woodford’s feedback rule interjects 
circular logic in his analysis.  While he argues that the nominal interest rate determines the price 
level; Woodford also assumes that the price level affects the nominal interest rate.  Because this 
again is clouded by the issue of the infinite horizon, this paper looks at a model of an “almost 
cashless” economy with a finite horizon.  In the limit as the horizon approaches infinity, this 
“almost cashless” economy approaches Woodford’s model.  In the “almost cashless” economy, 
the current nominal interest rate does determine the current price level, which means that the 
current price level cannot affect the current nominal interest rate as assumed in Woodford’s 
policy feedback function. - 3 - 
We limit this paper to Woodford’s Chapter 2 model with no monetary frictions and 
flexible prices.  While Woodford later does try to extend his model to include monetary frictions 
and to include somewhat rigid prices, we do not try to evaluate such extensions since his 
underlying model is flawed. 
Section II discusses the essence of Woodford’s model of a cashless economy and his 
argument that under certain policy feedback rules his model determines prices.  Section III 
discusses Sargent’s precedent for solving expectational difference equations, shows that that 
precedent does not universally apply, and argues that it does not apply to Woodford’s model.  
Furthermore, this section shows that a finite version of Woodford’s model is incomplete. 
The paper then proceeds to complete Woodford’s model.  While Woodford assumes 
complete markets without including the securities that complete the markets, we choose to avoid 
confusion by explicitly including state-contingent securities that complete the markets.  As a first 
step, section IV reviews an Arrow-Debreu economy and an important property of that economy.  
Section V then adds Eagle and Domian’s (2003a, 2003b) temporary money to this Arrow-Debreu 
economy to show that Woodford’s central bank is impotent, i.e., it is unable to affect the market 
nominal interest rate. 
Next, we modify the model of section V so that temporary money only exists at time T, 
the final period.  The result is a model of a finite, “almost cashless” economy that in the limit 
would correspond to Woodford’s model.  In this “almost cashless” economy, the current interest 
rate determines the current price level, which makes Woodford’s policy feedback rule 
impossible.  Also, section V uses the “almost cashless” model to show that an uncountably 
infinite number of price-level paths exist in Woodford’s model. 
Section VII then summaries and reflects upon this paper’s findings. - 4 - 
 
II. The Essence Of Woodford’s Model of a Cashless Economy 
  In his Chapter 2 model of a cashless economy, Woodford assumes a representative-
consumer, pure exchange economy with flexible prices.  While he does not explicitly include the 
securities necessary to complete markets, Woodford does assume markets are complete.  
Woodford then assumes the central bank sets the nominal interest rate by offering to borrow at 
the rate i
M.  He then obtains an equation which we will call the Fisher-Euler equation, which is:
1 
t jt jt jt
t t j t j t j t
t P c U
P c U E
i / ) (
] / ) ( [
1





+ + + +
x
x
b   (1) 
where it is the nominal interest rate, Pt is the price level at time t, and b is the time preference 
discount factor which is assumed to be the same for all consumers.  To avoid confusion caused 
by the representative consumer assumption, I have added j subscripts to consumption and to the 
utility shocks.  I also have added subscripts to the utility function and to consumption and to the 
utility shocks.  Consumer j’s utility function  ) ( jt jt c U¢  is assumed to be well behaved and reflects 
that each consumer is strictly risk averse.  This basic function is the same for all states of nature, 
with any utility shocks being reflected in the variables xjt.
2 
  Woodford (p. 17) states that his equation (1.21), which is essentially the same as equation 
(1) above “takes the form of a ‘Fisher’ equation for the nominal interest rate, where the 
                                                 
1 Because of my personal preference, equation (1) is actually the reciprocal of Woodford’s (1.21). 
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intertemporal marginal rate of substitution of the representative household plays the role of the 
interest rate.” 
  While this paper points out several flaws in Woodford’s analysis, it is important that we 
also give Woodford credit for correctly focusing on the Fisher-Euler equation (1) as the equation 
through which interest rates determine prices if the model is complete.  Woodford (p. 73) states, 
“I then have a system of two equations at each date, (1.15) and (1.21) to determine the two 
endogenous variables Pt and it…”  Since Woodford’s (1.15) just states that the nominal interest 
rate is pegged by the central bank, Woodford is saying that his Fisher-Euler equation with the 
nominal interest rate given determines prices under certain policy rules.  In section IV, we will 
confirm Woodford’s contention that the Fisher-Euler equation is how interest rates determine 
prices in a complete model.
3  However, in the next section we will learn that Woodford’s model 
is not complete and as a result, prices are not determined in his model. 
  Because Woodford assumes a representative consumer, he replaces the consumption in 
the Fisher-Euler equation with real aggregate supply.  He then loglinearizes the equation to get: 
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t P  is the targeted price level. 
  Woodford in his equation (1.34) then assumes an interest-rate pegging policy with 
feedback from prices: 
t t P t v P i + = ˆ ˆ f   (3) 
                                                 
3 Also, Eagle (2005c) uses the Fisher-Euler equation (1) as the basis for this analysis of the inflation dynamics of 
pegging interest rates. - 6 - 
where vt is random.  He then finds that a unique bounded solution exists for  t P ˆ .  From this, 
Woodford concludes that prices are determined in his model. 
  The first problem with Woodford’s analysis is his assumption that his solution must be 
bounded.  Woodford never states why he assumes his solution is bounded.  This absence of the 
justification of such an important assumption is academically inappropriate.  References should 
be provided for something this important.  This academic deficiency is even more compounded 
by Woodford’s refusal in personal correspondence with me to explain why he makes this 
assumption despite my requests for him to provide me this information. 
  At this time, I can only presume that Woodford bases his analysis on Sargent’s (1979) 
precedent for solving expectational difference equations.  The next section addresses this 
precedent. 
 
III. Solving Expectational Difference Equations 
  Woodford (2003) assumes that the solution to his expectational difference equation must 
be bounded apparently because of Sargent’s precedent to do so.  Sargent (1979) says that to 
solve expectational difference equations, one should solve convergent equations backwards and 
divergent equations forward.  He goes on to say that when solving expectational difference 
equations forward, one should assume that solution is bounded. 
  Eagle and Murff (2005) have reviewed the literature concerning Sargent’s precedent.  
They found that Sargent never proved his precedent works in all cases, although for one case he 
did start with a model with a finite horizon and showed that as that horizon approached infinity 
the resulting transversality condition implied the solution was bounded.  Eagle and Murff also 
show several examples where Sargent’s precedent leads to incorrect answers.  Eagle and Murff - 7 - 
recommend that instead of Sargent’s precedent, one solve expectational difference equations 
forward by assuming a finite horizon and taking the limit of the resulting terminal condition as 
the horizon approaches infinity. 
  Personal correspondence between the author and several economists confirms that 
Sargent did not prove his precedent applied in all cases.  Sargent (2004) wrote that he has been 
out of touch in the literature related to his precedent and states that, “Everything that I know 
about the issue is in Gabel and Roberts and in Whiteman,…”
4  Levin (2004) wrote, “You may 
not be aware that there is a large literature in economics that attacks the issue of the boundedness 
of solutions to infinite horizon problems generally with the use of examples and models from 
economics... .  In the case of single person optimization problems, this falls under the category of 
transversality conditions. Infinite horizon existence results generally follow from carefully 
relating a finite horizon truncated economy to the infinite horizon economy.  In some cases, 
boundedness follows naturally from economic assumptions.  In other cases (most obviously 
models of growth) they do not.” 
  The comments by Sargent and Levine indicate that since the assumption of boundedness 
does not universally apply, the appropriate approach is as Eagle and Murff (2005) suggest, which 
is to assume a finite horizon, determine the terminal conditions, and then take the limit as the 
horizon goes to infinity.  Thus, to determine whether the assumption of boundedness applies to 
Woodford’s model, we need to look at a finite version of his model. 
  Let T be the final period of such a finite version of the model.  Then there would be T+1 
periods in the model – periods t=0,1,2,…T.  Therefore, there would be T+1 price levels that 
would have to be determined by the model.  However, the Fisher-Euler equation (1) applies only 
for periods t=0,1,2,…,T-1.  The reason that the Fisher-Euler equation does not apply to period T - 8 - 
is because no interest rate exists at time T.  Because there is no period T+1, no borrowing or 
lending at time T can take place.  As a result, Woodford’s model has T+1 unknown price levels 
and only T Fisher-Euler equations.  Therefore, Woodford’s model is incomplete. 
  This actually understates the incompleteness of Woodford’s model as the price levels are 
random variables, so for each time period the number of price level values that need to be 
determined equals the number of states of nature at that time.  If n is the number of branches per 
node in a “decision” tree, Eagle and Murff (2005) argue that the ratio of the number of unknown 
price levels to the number of equations in Woodford’s model will approach n as the horizon 
approaches infinity. 
  It is true that Woodford’s optimization problem does include a transversality condition 
(See p. 72, equations (1.23) and (1.24)).  However, neither of Woodford’s conditions lead to a 
conclusion that the price level must be bounded.  In fact, unbounded price levels rather than 
bounded ones would help ensure that one of Woodford’s conditions holds (See his equation 
(1.24)).  Also, Woodford’s argument does include his policy feedback rule.  A question exists as 
to whether that policy feedback rule completes his model.  I argue that the model remains 
incomplete.  First, Woodford’s policy feedback rule is contradictory in that equation (1) is how 
the current interest rate determines current prices when future prices are determined, and 
therefore current prices cannot affect the current interest rate.  This contradiction is made clearer 
in section VI of this paper.  Second, since it also involves the interest rate, Woodford’s policy 
feedback rule only applies for periods 0,1,2,…T-1.  Hence, including this feedback rule doubles 
the number of equations.  If there are n nodes per branch in a decision” tree where n>2, then the 
resulting number of equations will still be less than needed to complete Woodford’s model. 
                                                                                                                                                             
4 Sargent refers to Gabel & Roberts (1987) and Whiteman (1983) - 9 - 
  Section VI does complete the finite version of Woodford’s model by adding Eagle and 
Domian’s (2003a, 2003b) temporary money to the final period of the model, which then 
determines the price level for that final period.  We then use this model to show that Woodford’s 
feedback rule is contradictory and that an uncountable infinity of price sequences exist that in the 
limit are consistent with Woodford’s model. 
  Because the model of section VI explicitly includes state-contingent securities to 
complete the markets, the next section reviews an Arrow-Debreu pure exchange economy. 
 
IV. A Quick Review of An Arrow-Debreu Pure Exchange Economy 
This section reviews a standard Arrow-Debreu pure exchange economy without storage 
consisting of one nonstorable consumption good.  It also discusses the important Consumption-
Aggregate-Supply Invariance Property of that economy. 
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where  0 j c  is j’s consumption at time 0,  jst c  is j’s consumption in state s at time t, b is the time 
preference discount factor, and  st p  is the probability of state s occurring at time t.  The T 
represents the last period of the economy and St is the number of possible states at time t. The 
utility functions  ) ( jt jt c U  are continuous, twice differentiable, strictly concave (i.e., strickly risk 
averse), and strictly increasing.  To rule out corner solutions, assume 
+¥ = ¢ = ¢
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0 0 0 c U c U jt c j c .  The time frame for the s subscript is determined by the t - 10 - 
subscript to the right of the s subscript.  For example, the s in  1 js c  refers to one of the possible 
states that can occur at time 1. 
At time 0, consumers can buy or sell state-contingent securities.  These state-contingent 
securities are prepaid securities where the buyer pays the seller the price of the security at time 0.  
Let  jst x  represent individual j’s demand at time 0 for the state-contingent security that delivers 
one consumption good at time t iff state s occurs at time t.  Define  st W  so that the price of this 
security equals  st st P W p 0 .   With it so defined,  st W  represents the real pricing kernel. 
Each consumer j chooses  jst x  for all s and t to maximize (4) subject to: 
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where (6) applies for all s=1,2,…,St for all t=1,2,…,T. 






















states s at time t and for t=1,2,…T, where the aggregate supply of the consumption good is 
represented by  0 Y  at time 0 and  st Y  in state s at time t respectively.  Consumer j’s optimization 
problem is satisfied when 
st st
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The left side of (7) is the real pricing kernel and the right side is the intertemporal marginal rate 
of substitution.  Some literature mistakenly defines the pricing kernel as the intertemporal - 11 - 
marginal rate of substitution (See, for example, Campbell, Lo, and MacKinlay, 1997, p. 294).  
The equality between the real pricing kernel and the intertemporal marginal rate of substitution 
shown in (7) is an equilibrium condition, not a definition. 
  Since this is a standard one-good, Arrow-Debreu pure-exchange economy with well 
behaved utility functions, a unique competitive equilibrium exists and that competitive 
equilibrium is Pareto efficient.  Also, the following property holds: 
Consumption-Aggregate-Supply Invariance Property: Let 1 and 2 represent any two 
different states of nature.  If Y1t=Y2t, and  t j t j 2 1 x x =  for all j, then  t j t j c c 2 1 =  for all j. 
Proof by contradiction.  Assume there is some consumption allocation in a competitive 
equilibrium where for some t and some states 1 and 2 at time t,  t j t j 2 1 x x =  for all j, , 
Y1t=Y2t, and there are two individuals j and k such that  t j t j c c 2 1 <  and  t k t k c c 2 1 > .  Since 
this is an Arrow-Debreu competitive equilibrium, the consumption allocation must be 
Pareto efficient.  Define  ( ) t j t j t j c c c 2 1 2
1
1
~ + º  and  ( ) t k t k t k c c c 2 1 2
1
1
~ + º .  Define a new 
consumption allocation where for all consumers, for all states of nature, and for all time 
periods, the new consumption equals the old consumption except that j’s consumption in 
states 1 and 2 are both  t j c 1
~ and k’s consumption in states and 2 are both  t k c 1
~ .  The new 
consumption allocation is obviously feasible since the original allocation was feasible.  
Because both j and k are strictly risk averse, they are both better off with this new 
consumption allocation.  However, that contradicts the statement that the original 
consumption allocation is Pareto efficient.  We, therefore, conclude that  t j t j c c 2 1 =  for all 
j.  Q.E.D. 
 
  The Consumption-Aggregate-Supply Invariance Property has important implications to 
economic theory.  In particular, Eagle and Domian (2003a, 2003b) use the property to show that 
their quasi-real bonds dominate nominal bonds in the sense that no one will choose to issue or 
hold nominal bonds in their model.  The reason is that nominal bonds expose both the issuer and 
the holder to the risk that the real value of the nominal bond payments will change as a result of 
nominal aggregate demand changing even though real aggregate supply does not change.  Since 
the Consumption-Aggregate-Supply Invariance Property states that, in the absence of utility - 12 - 
shocks, Pareto-efficient consumption does not change when real aggregate supply remains the 
same; exposing oneself to this nominal risk would be not be Pareto efficient.  This raises the 
question as to how the central bank could affect the economy by controlling the interest rate on 
nominal bonds.  The next section helps answer this question.  In doing so, it finds that 
Woodford’s central bank is impotent, i.e., it is unable to affect the market level of the nominal 
interest rate. 
V. Central Bank Impotence 
  Woodford argues that his central bank can control the nominal interest rate even though 
there are no monetary frictions in his economy.  He does so with an arbitrage argument that is 
typically used in the field of Finance.  Let it be the market interest rate on one-period nominal 
bonds at time t and let 
M
t i  be the interest rate paid on central-bank-issued, one-period nominal 
bonds issued at time t.  Woodford argues that if 
M
t i >it, then consumers will borrow at it and lend 
at 
M
t i  driving the market nominal interest it up to 
M
t i .  Even though this is a typical Finance 
arbitrage argument, it is invalid.  This section develops a model to show that Woodford’s central 
bank is impotent in its ability to affect the market nominal interest rate.  For any finite amount of 
money the central bank borrows, no matter how large, the “market” nominal interest rate will be 
unaffected;  in other words the market nominal interest rate will not be bid up. 
  The model of this section adds Eagle and Domian’s (2003a, 2003b) temporary money to 
the Arrow-Debreu economy of the previous sections.  It also adds government nominal subsidies 
and nominal taxes, since Woodford’s model includes such subsidies and taxes. 
  When consumers wake up each period, they wake up to endowments of both the 
consumption and another good, called type M good, that does not enter their utility functions.  - 13 - 
Neither the type M good nor the consumption good can be stored from one period to the next.  
While the individual consumers receive the endowments of the type M good, the consumption 
good is collectively received.  We assume that a law of the economy is that the consumption 
good will be distributed based on the one’s relative holdings of the type M good.  From now on 
in this paper, we refer to the type M good as “temporary money.” 
  Let Nst be the aggregate amount of temporary money in state s at time t and let  jst h  be the 
amount of temporary money endowed to consumer j in state s at time t.  Then if consumer j 
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P = . 
  Let Zj0 and Zjst be the nominal government subsidies paid to consumer j at time 0 and in 
state s at time t respectively.  Negative values represent nominal lump-sum taxes paid by 
consumer j.  Also, let Bj0 and Bjst represent j’s demands for non-central-bank-issued nominal 
bonds.  These bonds can either be issued by the government or issued privately.  Negative values 
for these demands represent bonds that j chooses to issue. 
  In this model we assume that the central bank lends a finite amount of nominal bonds.  
The amount the central bank lends can be arbitrarily large, but it must be finite.  If 
M
t i >it, then 
each consumer will want to buy an infinite amount of the central-bank-issued nominal bonds.  
Therefore, when the central bank issues only a finite amount of these bonds, those bonds will - 14 - 
have to be rationed.  Let Mj0 and Mjst respectively represent j’s rationed amount of these bonds 
for time-0 bonds and for time-t bonds issued when state s occurs at time t.  If 
M
t i =it then these 
symbols represent j’s demand for these bonds. 
Below is the consumer’s optimization problem of the previous section modified to 
incorporate the temporary money, the government subsidies/taxes, central-bank-issued bonds 
and privately-issued nominal bonds. 
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where (9) holds for s=1..St and for t=1..T.  These constraints are the same as constraints (6) and 
(7) except we include temporary money, government subsidies and taxes, and nominal bonds 
whether issued by the central bank or by others.  Also, equation (9) includes the price level in 
state s at time t, which is determined from the temporary money. 
  We need to be careful not to let the government subsidies and taxes confuse the analysis.  
The government subsidies or taxes could end up redistributing wealth.  Such redistribution will 
then affect the consumption allocation.  Since this paper’s analysis requires that we compare the 
resulting consumption allocation to the consumption under the original Arrow-Debreu model, we 
need to assume that government subsidies and taxes not be wealth redistributing. Similarly, we 
need make sure the rationing of the central-bank-issued nominal bonds does not redistribute 
wealth.  In a competitive economy with complete markets, in order that the subsidies, taxes, and 
rationing not be wealth redistributing, consumers must be able to afford the same consumption 
allocation after the subsidies, taxes, and rationing as in the original Arrow-Debreu model.  - 15 - 
Another way of saying this is that if wealth is not redistributed in this economy, then the original 
Arrow-Debreu consumption allocation must also satisfy the budget constraints when subsidies, 
taxes, and rationing are included. 
  An issue Woodford does not completely address in his analysis is the cash-flow 
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Note that the sum of the quantity demands for privately issued bonds should equal zero.  Thus 
the sum of the quantity demands for all non-central-bank-issued  (NCBI) bonds should equal the 
amount of government-issued bonds.  These funds plus the funds from the central-bank-issued 
(CBI) bonds will equal the amount of subsidies the government pays at time 0.  For future 
periods, the sum of the government-issued bonds plus central-bank-issued bonds will equal the 
subsidies the government makes plus the principal and interest payments the government or 
central bank must pay on the bonds they issued the previous period.
5 
The Central-Bank-Impotence and Nominal-Hedging Proposition: If government 
subsidies, taxes and central-bank-bond rationing does not redistribute wealth, then the following 
conditions hold in any competitive equilibrium: 
(i)  Consumers have the same consumption allocation as in the original Arrow-
Debreu model. 
                                                 
5 In addition to assuming a government that spends no funds, Woodford later in Chapter 2 analyzes a government 
that does spend funds.  In order to avoid the issue of whether government spending is Pareto efficient, this paper 
only considers a government that spends no money on government consumption. - 16 - 
(ii)  For temporary money given in each period, the market-determined nominal 
interest rates are the same as if no government subsidies or taxes and no central 
bank bonds exist. 
(iii)  Each individual’s demand to hold or issue nominal bonds exactly hedges that 
individual against nominal government subsidies or taxes.  Therefore, each 
individual j’s demands for nominal bonds are given by (Equation (13) holds for 
all states s at time t and for t=1,2,…,T.: 
0 0 0 j j j M Z B - =   (12) 
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Proof: Since the subsidies, taxes and rationing do not redistribute wealth, each consumer 
can afford the same consumption allocation as in the original Arrow-Debreu economy.  Since 
that consumption allocation is Pareto-efficient, they will not change. .  This proves (i).  As long 
as temporary money and real aggregate supply are the same for each state, the price levels for 
each state will also be the same.  Given these price levels and given that the consumption levels 
will not change, the Fisher-Euler equation (1) implies that the nominal interest rates will be the 
same with subsidies, taxes, and rationing as without.  This proves (ii). Nominal bonds expose 
both the bond issuer and the bond holder to nominal risk. Therefore, risk-averse investors would 
not choose to hold any nominal bonds in a competitive equilibrium where no other nominal 
contracts existed.  However, the nominal government subsidies, taxes, and central-bank-bond 
rationing do expose the consumers to nominal risk.  As a result, the consumers will choose to 
issue or hold nominal bonds as a hedge against these other nominal contracts.  Specifically, each 
consumer would issue or hold exactly the amount of nominal bonds necessary to hedge against 
the nominal subsidies, taxes, and central-bank-bond rationing.  The exact amount that the 
nominal (NCBI) bonds each consumer j would need to hold in order to get this perfect hedge are 
given in equations (12) and (13) because if we subtract (12) and (13) from (8) and (9) 
respectively, we will get the constraints that would exist if no subsidies, taxes, and central-bank-
bond rationing existed.  By (ii), those no-subsidy, no-tax, no-central-bank-rationing constraints 
must hold even though subsidies, taxes, and central-bank-bond rationing do exist.  In fact, the 
only way that those no-subsidy, no-tax, no-central-bank-rationing constraints can be met while 
(8) and (9) are also met is for conditions (12) and (13) to hold.  This proves (iii).  Q.E.D. 
 
  The hedging statement of the above proposition is relatively easy to understand.  The 
only reason that risk-averse consumers would choose to hold nominal bonds is to hedge against 
other nominal contracts, which in this model are nominal subsidies and taxes.  We can use this - 17 - 
hedging statement to more fully understand the central-bank impotence part of the proposition.  
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, which respectively represent the aggregate subsidies (taxes), 
aggregate central-bank-issued nominal bonds, and aggregate demand for NCBI nominal bonds 
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which then represents the net new central-bank issued nominal debt at time t (net of principal and 
interest paid on previously issued such debt).  Note that  0 0
~ ~ ~
M M =  since at time t=0 there is no 
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T T M i M  since at time T, no new debt 
whatsoever can be issued but the central bank still must pay back the principal and interest on its 
previously issued debt. 
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which then presents the net new NCBI nominal debt at time t (net of principal and interest paid 
on previously issued such debt).  Again, 
d d B B 0 0
~ ~ ~











 to be the net new government-issued (but not central-bank-issued) 




 is net of principal and interest the government pays in period t on - 18 - 




 and  t M
~ ~
, the government cash 
flow constraints (10) and (11) can be rewritten as just one constraint: 
t t
s
t Z M B
~ ~ ~ ~ ~
= +   (16) 
This states that the net new government nominal debt plus the net new central-bank debt must 
equal the total amount of subsidies paid by the government.  (Even though negative subsidies 
represents taxes, I will from now on just refer to subsidies to try to make the reading easier.) 
We will consider two scenarios when there is an increase in  t M
~
 for some t between 0 and 
T-1, but no change in  t M
~
 occurs for any t¹t.  Under the first scenario the subsidies remain 
unchanged even though  t M
~
 changes.  Under the second scenario, the subsidies change to 




Let us begin with Scenario I where for some t between 0 and T-1,  t M
~
 increases by one 
“buck,” but all subsidies remain the same as before the change and no change in  t M
~
 occurs for 
any t¹t.  The first effect is that  t M
~ ~





decreases by one buck since consumers only use nominal bonds to hedge against nominal 
subsidies.  Since subsidies under Scenario I remain unchanged, consumers’ demands for all 
nominal bonds, whether central-bank-issued or otherwise, will not change. Hence when  t M
~ ~
 
increases by one buck, consumers will reduce their demand for NCBI nominal bonds by an equal 




 will decrease by one buck. - 19 - 




 will decrease by one buck.  This is clear from 
(16).  When  t Z
~
 remains the same, an increase in  t M
~ ~














 will each decrease by one buck.  In other words, 
both the demand curve and supply curve for NCBI nominal bonds will shift to the left by one 
buck.  When both the demand and supply shift to the left equally, the “equilibrium” interest rate 
is unaffected.  Here, “equilibrium” refers to equilibrium in the NCBI nominal bond market. 
Now let us consider the effect on the net new nominal debt demand and supply at time 
t+1. Since  t M
~
 increases by one buck and  1
~
+ t M  does not change, (14) implies that  1
~ ~
+ t M  will 
decrease by  ) 1 (
M
t i + .  However, since no subsidy has changed, the aggregate demand by 
consumers for nominal bonds from whatever source is unchanged.  Therefore, this decrease in 
1
~ ~
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+  mean both the demand 
and supply curves for net new NCBI nominal bonds at time t+1 shift to the right by equal 
amounts, resulting in no change in the “equilibrium” nominal interest rate.  (Again, 
“equilibrium” is defined as equilibrium in the NCBI nominal bond market.) 
For t=t+2,…,T;  1
~ ~
+ t M  does not change.  We therefore conclude that under Scenario 1, no 
change in the equilibrium nominal interest rate will occur for a one buck, one-time increase in 
central-bank-issued and rationed nominal bonds.  This argument would reach the same 
conclusion for any finite such increase in the central-bank-issued and rationed nominal bonds. - 20 - 
Now consider Scenario 2 where any change in  t M
~ ~
 is accompanied by an equal increase 
in the subsidies  t Z
~
.  However, because  t Z
~
 increases exactly with any increase in  t M
~ ~
, the 
consumers will have more nominal subsidies to hedge against and therefore will demand an 
equal increase in the net new nominal debt they hold, whether central-bank-issued or otherwise.  
Since that increase in net new nominal debt they demand will equal the increase in the net new 
central-bank-issued debt they are rationed, their demand for net new NCBI nominal debt will be 








 will not change when  t M
~ ~
 
and  t Z
~
 increase by equal amounts. If neither the demand nor supply for net new NCBI debt 
changes, then there will be no change in the “equilibrium” nominal interest rate. 
We, therefore, conclude that Woodford’s central bank is impotent.  For any finite 
increase in central-bank-issued and rationed bonds, neither the demand for nor the supply of 
NCBI bonds shifts under scenario 2, resulting in no change in the equilibrium nominal interest 
rate.  On the other hand, in scenario 1, the demand and supply curves for NCBI nominal bonds 
shift in the same direction by the same amount, again resulting in no change to the equilibrium 
nominal interest rate. 
 
VI. An “Almost Cashless” Economy  
  In this section, we modify the model of the previous section, by assuming that temporary 
money only exists at time T.  To bypass the problem of central bank impotence discussed in the 
previous section, we assume that the central bank is given the authority to legally dictate the 
nominal interest rate paid in the market.  The resulting economy is one which is “almost 
cashless.”  It is cashless for periods t=0,1,…,T-1.  Only in period T is there any monetary - 21 - 
friction, and that is the monetary friction of temporary money.  We show in this economy that 
when the central bank dictates or pegs the nominal interest rate, that nominal interest rate for 
time t determines the price level for time t.  This then makes it impossible for the price level at 
time t to affect the nominal interest rate at time t.  We show that Woodford’s model of a cashless 
economy can be looked at as a limit of this section’s “almost cashless” economy.  In doing so we 
learn that there are an uncountably infinite number of price paths consistent with Woodford’s 
model. 
  At time T, the consumers collectively receive the endowment of the consumption good, 
which they allocate among themselves based on each consumer’s relative endowment of 
temporary money.  Since temporary money only exists in period T, we make the usual 
assumption that consumers individually receive endowments of the consumption good for 
periods prior to period T. 
The amount of temporary money and real aggregate supply at time T will determine the 
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Now we move backwards using Bellman’s principle.  If we solve the Fisher-Euler equation (1) 
for Pst, we get: 
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 - 22 - 
Because markets are complete, we know that the 
consumption allocation will be the same as for the original 
Arrow-Debreu economy.  Assume that  1 , + t s P  is given for 
all s at time t+1 (which it would if t+1=T).  Then if the 
central bank pegged the interest rate, then all random 
variables on the right side of (18) would be given which 
means that the price level at time t would be determined.  
By backward recursion, we conclude that prices are determined. 
  Figure 1 plots relationship (18).  Under the complete markets assumption, every 
consumer will know his/her own consumption allocation for each state and for all time t.  Also, 
the future price level in state s at time t+1 is known.  We, therefore, conclude that the numerator 
of (18) is known at time t.  Therefore, if the central bank dictates or pegs the nominal interest 
rate at 
*
t i , then (18) implies the price level that will result.  If the central bank were to increase 
the nominal interest rate, a lower price level would result; whereas a lower nominal interest rate 
would result in a higher price level.
6 
  Since the current nominal interest rate determines the current price level, it cannot be the 
case that the central bank uses the current price level to determine the nominal interest rate it will 
dictate or peg.   
  A relatively simple example can make this clear.  Assume the economy lasts for two 
periods: period 0 and period 1.  Assume consumers have identical logarithmic utility functions 
without utility shocks and have perfect foresight concerning period 1.  Then, consumer j will 
maximize: 
                                                 




t i  
*
t P  
Figure 1: Price Determination in 
“Almost cashless” Economy - 23 - 
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  (21) 
In this simple example, there is only one state-contingent security, since there is only one future 
time and one state for that time because of the assumption of certainty. 
  Assume that N1=100 and Y1=100, which imply by (17) P1=1.00.  Also, assume that 
05 . 1
1



















=   (22) 
In the above we also used that P1=1.00, that there are no utility shocks, and that the utility 








c j j =  (See Eagle and Domian, 2003b).  If we also assume Y0=Y1, then  1 0 j j c c = , which 







=   (23) 
Therefore, if the central bank dictates or pegs i0=5%, then P0 will equal 1.00.  On the other hand, 
if the central bank dictates or pegs i0=2%, then P0=1.05/1.02»1.03. 
We now ask, “How does Woodford’s feedback rule fit into this model?” Remember, that 
Woodford’s feedback rule is where the central bank uses the current price level to determine the - 24 - 
nominal interest rate it pegs.  However, at the time when the central bank makes its decision as to 
what nominal interest rate to peg, the current price level is not yet determined; it will be 
determined only after the central bank pegs the nominal interest rate. 
  Suppose Woodford’s feedback rule is: 
( )( ) ) ( 1 1 1
* *
t t t t P P i i - + + = + j   (24) 
where 
*
t i  is the nominal interest rate that the central bank should peg according to Woodford’s 
feedback rule,  t i  is the nominal interest rate that would be consistent with the targeted price level 
*
t P .  If we assume that  00 . 1
*
0 = P , then (23) implies that  t i  is 5%.  If we then take (24) for t=0 
and j>0 and combine it with (23) and  00 . 1
*
0 = P , we get  2
2
0 0 1 P P P j j - + = , whose only 
positive solution is P0=1.00.  While Woodford’s “feedback” equation (24) can be combined with 
(23) to find a particular P0 and i0, it would be a mistake to call equation (24) a “feedback” 
equation.  The solution to (23) and (24) is just a consistency solution.  It is merely saying the 
only observation that would be consistent with Woodford’s “feedback” function and (23) would 
be when the price level in fact turns out to be 1.00 and the nominal interest rate equals 5%.  As 
stated before, in this model the current nominal interest rate determines the current price level.  
Thus, at the time the central bank dictates or pegs the current nominal interest rate, the current 
price level is unknown. 
  Since this section’s model is “almost cashless,” one might wonder what would happen if 
we took the limit of the model as T goes to infinity.  We can think about Woodford’s Chapter 2 
model of a cashless model as such a limit.   
Note that PT is determined by NT, which we are assuming is just an endowment from 
nature, not something under the control of the central bank.  The value of NT could be any 
positive real number.  Since PT=NT/YT, PT could also be any positive real number.  Since the - 25 - 
number of positive real numbers is uncountably infinite, the number of possible values of PT will 
be uncountably infinite.  Since Pt for t=0,...,T-1 depends on the expected value of PT, there will 
be an uncountably infinite number of price sequences over time in the “almost cashless” 
economy unless we anchor NT.  However, if we take the limit of the “almost cashless” economy, 
then in that limit, we never get to period T because in the limit there is no terminal period.  
Hence, in the limit there is nothing to specify NT; hence there will be an uncountably infinite 
number of price sequences consistent with that limit.  In other words, in the limit prices are not 
determined. 
For example, again assume perfect foresight and logarithmic utility functions without 
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Assume also that the central bank dictates the nominal interest rate so that (1+it)b=1 for 
all t and assume that real aggregate supply is constant over time.  Under these assumptions (18) 
becomes T t P P = .  Since PT=NT/YT, it follows that Pt=NT/YT.  Now think about the set of all such 
“almost cashless” finite economies where NT is a particular positive real number.  For each 
possible value of NT, there is a unique price sequence where all Pt=NT/YT.  Since NT is a 
particular positive real number, there can be an uncountably infinite number of  possible values 
for NT and therefore an uncountably infinite number of possible price sequences.  Since the - 26 - 
“almost cashless” economy with any of the uncountable infinite number of possible price 
sequences will converge to Woodford’s model as the horizon T goes to infinity, we conclude that 
there will be an uncountable infinite number of price sequences that are consistent with 




  This paper has shown that Woodford makes four logical fallacies in his analysis of his 
Chapter 2 model of a cashless economy.  First, he erroneously assumes that the solution to his 
expectational difference equation must be bounded.  While his making that assumption does 
have precedent in the economic literature, that literature never proves that one can make that 
assumption in all cases and in some cases it does lead to erroneous solutions. 
  The appropriate way to solve the expectational difference equations is to assume a finite 
horizon, determine the terminal condition, and then take the limit of that terminal condition as 
the horizon goes to infinity.  Doing so with Woodford’s model, shows that any finite version of 
his model is incomplete, which is Woodford’s second fallacy. 
  This paper looks at the economics behind Woodford’s claim that the central bank in his 
model can control the nominal interest rate paid on non-central-bank-issued bonds.  We conclude 
that Woodford’s claim is vacuous, that Woodford’s central bank is impotent.  In particular, we 
find that any finite issuance of central-bank-issued bonds will not be able to affect the 
“equilibrium” nominal interest rate where “equilibrium” refers to equilibrium in the non-central-
bank-issued bond market. - 27 - 
  This paper also looks at an “almost cashless,” finite economy that in the limit approaches 
Woodford’s model (with the exception that we had to assume that the central bank dictates the 
nominal interest rate to avoid the central-bank-impotence problem).  We find that the current 
interest rate determines the current price level, which makes Woodford’s feedback rule 
impossible.  At the time the central bank dictates or pegs the nominal interest rate, the current 
price level has yet to be determined; the current price level at the point is unknown. 
  While this paper finds four fallacies with Woodford’s analysis, this does not necessarily 
say that we should reject all of Woodford’s policy recommendation.  For example, Eagle (2005b) 
has modified Woodford’s feedback rule to be  




t t t t t P P E i i - + + = + - j   (23) 
While the central bank at time t does not know Pt, the public’s expectations at time Et-1[Pt] may 
be known.  The feedback rule (23) does enhance the credibility of a central bank according to 
Eagle’s analysis. 
  However, I would recommend against any attempt to totally make an economy cashless 
as Woodford has argued is possible.  Only if future prices are determined, can pegging the 
interest rate affect current prices today through the Fisher-Euler equation (1).  In Woodford’s 
totally cashless economy, future prices are not determined and therefore the Fisher-Euler 
equation (1) does not determine prices. 
Many mathematical techniques used in economics came from applications in rocket 
science including Ito calculus, the Wiener process, and much of control theory.  Suppose the 
transfer of knowledge in the future goes from economics to rocket science.  In particular, let us 
consider the absurd implications that rocket scientists would encounter if they were to adopt 
Woodford’s approach to solving expectational difference equations. - 28 - 
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Figure 1. Actual vs. targeted time paths  
Suppose a rocket is located in space at  0 x .  
The rocket has one thrust to send it off at a 
constant speed.  While the control center has 
targeted a path for the rocket, it has no mechanism 
to control the rocket’s direction.  Define  t x  and 
*
t x  to respectively represent the actual and targeted location vectors of the rocket at time t.  
Define 
* ˆ t t t x x x - º  , which is the distance between  t x  and 
*
t x .  For the moment, suppose the 
rocket scientists were to follow Woodford’s lead of assuming the solution of  t x ˆ  is bounded.   If 
the rocket’s actual trajectory differs from the targeted trajectory, then  ¥ = -
¥ ®
* lim t t t x x  (See 
Figure 1).  Therefore, the only bounded solution of  t x ˆ  is where the rocket is forever on target.  If 
the rocket scientists were to apply Woodford’s type of analysis to this rocket example, they 
would then conclude that they could perfectly determine the rocket’s trajectory even though they 
had no steering mechanism to cause that to happen.  Such a conclusion would be absurd. 
Just as there is no steering mechanism in the rocket example, Woodford’s model has no 
monetary frictions and hence no mechanism by which monetary policy affects nominal aggregate 
demand and hence prices.  It is true that Woodford has the Fisher-Euler equation (1), but that 
equation is more like a law of motion, not a steering mechanism. 
Is Woodford’s analysis rocket science?  I do not think it is.  I myself hope never to be on 
any rocket (or an economy) that has been designed on the basis of Woodford’s type of analysis. 
 - 29 - 
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